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I. INTRODUCTION
If one seeks to enforce a contract governed by an applicable statute of
frauds, it is universally deemed necessary under all such statutes to esta-
blish the existence of a "sufficient writing" signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought. Suppose that the only document that was
signed by the other party is the offer that was accepted (or forseeably relied
upon) to form the contract. Is a signed offer a "sufficient writing" to satisfy
the statute of frauds requirement?
One would expect that the standard contract law treatises would
provide a simple and consistent yes-or-no answer to this seemingly straight-
forward question. Unfortunately, this is not the case. For example, the
well-known Murray on Contracts treatise' flatly states that a signed offer
will not suffice to satisfy the "typical American statute of frauds,"2 while
the equally well-know Calamari and Perillo Contracts treatise 3 states on the
authority of the first and second editions of the Restatement of the Law of
Contracts that a signed offer will be sufficient.4 The perhaps most widely
consulted Farnsworth Contracts treatise5 states that "[a]n offer ... should
suffice," 6 but later recognizes there is some authority holding to the con-
trary when applying Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code,7 a
result that Farnsworth views as in conflict with the intent of the drafters of
the UCC.8 Finally, the well-regarded Uniform Commercial Code treatise
by White and Summers 9 states that to be sufficient under UCC Section 2-
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1. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2001).
2. Id. at 378 (stating, "[i]t is important to emphasize the requirement that the writing
evidence a contract rather than a mere offer of preliminary negotiation.") (emphasis in original).
3. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1998).
4. Id. at 754 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 207(a) (1932); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (b) (1979)).
5. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1999).
6. Id. at 395-96.
7. Id. at 396.
8. Id.
9. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (3rd ed. 1988).
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201, the writing "must indicate the consummation of a contract, not mere
negotiations, nor a mere offer, nor a counter-offer."10
The treatise writers appear to be in some disagreement. In this short
article I will attempt to clarify the law on this point and offer one sug-
gestion for change. This article will seek to demonstrate that much of the
confusion noted above stems from the writers sometimes failing to dis-
tinguish clearly between the general run of "common law" state statutes of
frauds and UCC Section 2-201, which states the "sufficient writing"
requirement very differently.
As I will show, this great weight of the authority with regard to the
common law" statutes of frauds has long been in favor of regarding a
signed offer as a sufficient writing. In contrast, the cases are divided re-
garding UCC Section 2-201. Most courts that have interpreted that pro-
vision have found that a signed offer is not sufficient to satisfy that statute.
I will argue that this majority interpretation of UCC Section 2-201, as
contrary to common law authority, is open to criticism in that it gives pri-
macy to a literal reading of the language of the statutory text despite
reasonable arguments that can be offered that this interpretation does not
reflect the intent of its drafters. Finally, I will attempt to show that another
reasonable interpretation is available for Section 2-201 that is probably
literal enough for all but linguistic purists, and that would in my opinion
better reflect the intent of the drafters of the UCC.
II. DISCUSSION
The original English Statute of Frauds adopted in 1677 required that to
enforce a contract, "the agreement ... or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.""
Virtually all American jurisdictions have long since enacted their own
versions of this statute.' 2 These formulations have identical or very similar
specifications of the writing requirement.13 The Restatement of the Law of
Contracts at Section 207 attempts to summarize the applicable case law that
has elaborated upon these various statutes of frauds as of 1932 when it
broadly stated that "any document or writing" that is signed by the party to
be charged is sufficient if it identifies the parties, subject matter, and terms
and conditions of the contract. 14 Also presented at Illustration 2 to Section
10. Id. at 85 §§ 2-4 (footnotes omitted).
11. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 364 (citing 1677, 2 Car., c.3, §4 (Eng.)).
12. Id. at 364-65.
13. Id.
14. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1932).
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207 is a hypothetical indicating a published offer would be sufficient.1 5 In
addition, Section 209 declares "[iut is not essential to the validity of a
memorandum under the Statute that the writing shall have been made as a
memorandum of a contract."16 Presented at Illustration 3 to Section 209 is
a hypothetical demonstrating that a signed offer sent to the offeree will be
sufficient. ' 7
The subsequent Restatement (Second) of Contracts at Section 131 is
more succinct with regard to the issue considered.' 8 It states that a signed
writing that identifies the subject matter and essential terms of the contract
is acceptable if it "is sufficient to indicate that a contract with respect there-
to has been made between the parties or offered by the signer to the other
party."19 Official Comment f to Section 131 states "[a] signed written offer
to the public may be sufficient even though the offeree is not identified."20
Illustration 2 to Section 131 presents another hypothetical used to show that
a published offer would be sufficient.21
Two substantial mid-twentieth century American Law Reports
annotations demonstrate that the Restatement position is not mere pro-
fessorial conjecture or an aspirational norm, but is grounded solidly in an
extensive body of case law holding offers sufficient to satisfy the various
state "common law" statutes of frauds.22 While these annotations each pre-
sent some authority to the contrary, they together identify numerous cases
from many jurisdictions, decided in many different contexts that support the
proposition that a signed offer will be sufficient. 23 A few cases decided af-
ter these annotations were published and are also consistent with this
proposition. 24 Excerpts from the Calamari & Perillo and Farnsworth trea-
tises noted above are based upon this body of case law and the resulting
Restatement formulations. 25
15. Id. § 207, illus. 2.
16. Id. § 209.
17. Id. § 209, illus. 3.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (1979).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Id. § 131 cmt. f.
21. Id. § 131, illus. 2.
22. A.M. Swarthout, Memorandum Which Will Satisfy Statute of Frauds, as Predictable in
Whole or in Part upon Writings Prior to the Oral Agreement, 1 A.L.R.2D 841, 852-53 (1948); E.
LeFevre, Oral Acceptance of Written Offer by Party Sought to be Charged as Satisfying Statute of
Frauds, 30 A.L.R.2D 972, 972-86 (1953).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Kirschling v. Lake Forest Sch. Dist., 687 F. Supp. 927 (D. Del. 1988); Benya v.
Stevens and Thompson Paper Co., 468 A.2d 929 (Vt. 1983).
25. See generally, FARNSWORTH supra note 5; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 3.
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What appears to have caused some confusion is that the drafters of the
UCC in formulating Section 2-201 significantly departed from the general
language of the various state statutes of frauds when they adopted a statute
of frauds requirement for sale of goods transactions over $500 in amount of
a "writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made." 26
The most literal and straightforward reading of this provision gives a clear
negative answer to the question considered in this article since this
existence of an offer, no matter how well established by written evidence,
does not necessarily mean that "a contract for sale has been made" since
that offer may have been rejected or otherwise terminated before being
accepted. Formation of a contract generally requires the acceptance of an
offer, as well as the satisfaction of any applicable mutual assent or con-
sideration requirements, or at least foreseeable reliance upon the offer under
a promissory estoppel contract formation theory, none of which could be
ascertained from the text of the offer alone. Therefore, UCC Section 2-201
by its requirements appears to preempt the prior common law practice of
accepting a signed offer as sufficient. Instead, it apparently imposes the
more stringent evidentiary requirement of a signed writing that evidences
all elements of contract formation, or at least evidence of an acceptance as
well as an offer. Most courts that have considered the status of signed of-
fers under UCC Section 2-201 have followed the lead of the earliest
appellate case to address this question, and without engaging in extended
discussion have also read the "a contract for sale has been made" phrase
literally to hold those offers to not be sufficient. 27 The Murray, White &
Summers, and second part of the Farnsworth treatise excerpts are based
primarily upon this UCC Section 2-201 case law.28
Only one case, Ore & Chemical Corporation v. Howard Butcher
Trading Corporation,29 departs from this now-entrenched literal inter-
pretation of UCC Section 2-201 to find that a signed offer is sufficient. 30 In
26. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2000).
27. See, e.g., Arcuri v. Weiss, 184 A.2d 24, 26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) (stating, "[slince this is
the first appellate decision touching upon this [status of offers under UCC Section 2-20 1] question
we feel some comment is needed. [Tihis section does require some writing which indicates THAT
A CONTRACT FOR SALE HAS BEEN MADE.") (emphasis in original). See also Barak Int'l
Corp. v. Mast Indus. Inc., 535 N.E.2d 633, 638 (N.Y. 1989); Micromedia v. Automated Broad.
Controls, 799 F.2d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 1986); Howard Constr. Co. v. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc., 669
S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo. App. 1983); Martco Inc. v. Doran Chevrolet, Inc., 632 S.W.2d 927, 928
(Tex. App. 1982); Oakley v. Little, 272 S.E.2d 370 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Barber v. McNamara-
Vivant Contracting Co., 293 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Minn. 1979); Maderas Tropicales v. S. Crate &
Veneer Co., 588 F.2d 971, 973-74 (5th Cir. 1979).
28. See generally MURRAY, supra note 1; FARNSWORTH, supra note 5; WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 9.
29. 455 F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
30. Ore, 455 F. Supp. at 1151-52.
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Ore, Judge Huyett disagreed strenuously with prior interpretations of the
statute's writing requirement. 3' He stated:
Some [UCC Section 2-201] cases have emphasized the language
"has been made" and held writings ineffective because they were
"future oriented" . . . [citations omitted] ... However, an exam-
ination of those cases reveals that the writings involved were not
offers but merely tokens of negotiations, one step further back in
the bargaining process. Keeping the purpose of the Statute of
Frauds in mind, we think the words "has been made" refer to the
evidentiary value of the writing and not to the situation that is,
whether a contract had been formed at the time the writing was
signed. The official comment is enlightening, "[a]ll that is
required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the
offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction." We do not
believe that the drafters intended to reject the rule applicable in
pre-code cases and render impermissible the use of a written offer
as a memorandum once that offer has been accepted. Any other
conclusion leads to an absurd result.32
Judge Huyett's quotation makes two points. First, it claimed that at
least some of the earlier UCC Section 2-201 cases that have held offers to
be insufficient can be distinguished on the basis that the "offers" there
considered were too tentative and preliminary to truly constitute offers.33
This may be true for some or all of these particular cases, but it does not
address the main question here considered: what about signed offers? More
importantly, the argument was advanced by Judge Huyett that the UCC
drafters did not intend to preclude the long-established common law prin-
ciple that signed offers are sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, and that
the Section 2-201 provision that the writing be sufficient to indicate that a
contract "has been made" should therefore be interpreted only to require the
writing to verify one aspect of a contract formation process, the making of
the offer, and not necessarily to also verify that the offer had been
accepted. 34 In the view of this court, to interpret UCC Section 2-201 to
impose a more stringent writing requirement than that applied under the
"common law" statutes of frauds and thereby find signed offers to be
insufficient would be "an absurd result." 35
31. ld. at 1153.
32. Id. at 1153-54.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1150.
35. Id. at 1153-54.
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Judge Huyett has a good point, although it is not as well articulated as
it might have been. The UCC was intended to be "liberally construed to
promote its underlying purposes and policies," 36 one of which is "to
simplify.. .the law governing commercial transactions." 37 I am not aware
of any evidence that the drafters of the UCC intended to impose a more
stringent statute of frauds requirement, and at least one knowledgeable
commentator has claimed that their intention with regard to the statute of
frauds was in fact "to relax the requirements of the statute."38 The Official
Comment to Section 2-201, quoted by Judge Huyett, while not explicit con-
cerning the statutory objectives and their relation to the prior jurisprudence
does suggest intent to relax rather than increase the burden of compliance
with the statute of frauds. 9 If this was in fact the drafters' intent, the literal
reading of UCC Section 2-201 that has been widely accepted and which
mandates that signed offers are insufficient, while not in my opinion an
"absurd result" given the obvious textual support for this reading and given
the increased protection it would provide offerors from false allegations of
contracts formed through acceptance of such offers, might nevertheless be
an inferior result compared to what could be achieved through a somewhat
more strained but not indefensible reading of the language that better
achieved the drafters' desired objectives. However, Judge Huyett to this
end argues rather unconvincingly that the "has been made" phrase does not
relate to whether a contract was formed, but only to the evidentiary value of
the writing, which unfortunately is a more tortured reading of this phrase
than the words will reasonably bear.a0
A more fruitful approach to an alternative interpretation of Section 2-
201 might be to consider what it means to "indicate" something. There is
linguistic room here for one to reasonably argue that when Section 2-201
states that the writing must only be sufficient to "indicate" that a contract
has been made, in a context where it is quite clear from the rest of the
statute that the writing need not set out completely or even correctly the
36. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2000).
37. Id. § 1-102(2)(a).
38. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 396.
39. Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Corp., 455 F. Supp 1150, 1153-54.
For example, Official Comment 1 quoted by Judge Huyett states that only the writing "afford a
basis" for believing that a real transaction has occurred is required, rather than requiring that the
writing demonstrate this fact conclusively. Id. Similarly, this Comment later summarizes the
sufficiency requirements by stating in part only that the writing must evidence a contract, as
opposed to demonstrating this fact conclusively. Id. A merely suggestive rather than a compre-
hensive and definitive signed writing may be all that the UCC drafters intended to require, as is
consistent with the prior common law position. Id.
40. Id. at 1153.
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terms of the contract.41 Given that the statute of frauds inquiry was never
intended to be definitive as to the existence of a contract because even a
written and signed contract may be a forgery, a signed offer should be re-
garded as sufficient to satisfy the statute.42 A signed offer does in fact serve
as such an "indicator" of the existence of a contract that screens out some
false allegations, even though it does not prove or even indicate-and thus
leaves open to some doubt-the existence of the other necessary contract
formation elements, such as acceptance or foreseeable reliance. To merely
"indicate" the existence of a contract it is not necessary to "fully specify" or
"prove" its existence; indicators necessarily abstract from the full
complexity of the circumstances they relate to and are generally recognized
as helpful but not completely reliable.4 3 This interpretation of Section 2-
201 does get to Judge Huyett's preferred result, which I also favor, but does
so in a much more satisfactory and defensible fashion.
Viewing the problem here in more general terms, what I perceive as
having taken place in the opinions interpreting Section 2-201 is a typically
"path-dependent" process of the accumulation of precedents into a line of
authority that is in my opinion, as well as in Judge Huyett's view, inferior
to what might have resulted had the first steps been taken down a very
different interpretive path, but which now has some precedential force and
inertia, and consequently will be difficult to reverse. The earliest relevant
UCC Section 2-201 opinions that considered the status of signed offers
focused only upon the most literal reading of the statutory "contract for sale
has been made" phrase, and apparently did not seriously consider either the
more expansive character of the prior common law in this area, or the
probable intent of the UCC drafters with regard to retaining or even ad-
vancing the liberality of that common law authority. 44 If one reads Section
41. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2000).
42. Id.
43. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, §§ 2-4 at 83. In their UCC treatise, White &
Summers lend support to the argument for an expansive view of what writings will satisfy the
"indicate" requirement of UCC section 2-201. Id.
[Elven if the plaintiff produces a writing... overwhelmingly "indicative" of
a contract, the defendant may still deny and prove there was no contract. For
the main theory of the writing sufficient under § 2-201(1) is not that it
conclusively proves the existence of a contract but that it affords the trier of
fact something reliable to go on in addition to the mere oral testimony of the
plaintiff.. .The spirit of [Karl Llewellyn and the UCC Official Comments]
seems to be that "sufficient to indicate" is roughly equivalent to "more
probable than not" rather than "no doubt."
Id. at 83-84.
"The writers do recognize, however, that the courts have interpreted this requirement to hold mere
offers to be insufficient." Id. at 84-85.
44. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 396.
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2-201 in isolation from those complicating contextual factors the most
straightforward and reasonable interpretation of that phrase is obviously
that signed offers are not sufficient. 45 Later cases then followed these early
precedents without meaningfully revisiting and applying principles of sta-
tutory interpretation to this question. The one opinion that did take issue
with this conclusion (the Ore opinion discussed above) unfortunately based
its argument on a very strained interpretation of the "has been made"
phrase, failed to adequately ground this interpretation in a convincing ex-
position of the pre-UCC common law and the probable intent of the UCC
drafters, and has subsequently and perhaps partially as a result been ignored
by later courts.46
III. CONCLUSION
The claims made by Calamari & Peril10 47 and Farnsworth 48 in their
treatises, as to signed offers being sufficient for statute of frauds purposes,
are correct in regards to the great weight of the case law interpreting the
general "common law" state statutes of frauds.49 With regards to UCC
Section 2-201, however, the courts with only one exception have embraced
the position taken by Murray5O and White & Summers5 1 in their treatises
that signed offers are not sufficient to satisfy the statute. All of these trea-
tise writers should make this distinction between the "common law" and the
UCC-based statute of frauds jurisprudence more clear in their subsequent
editions.
In my opinion, given the large body of common law authority heavily
in support of allowing signed offers to satisfy the "common law" statute of
frauds requirements, and given the general stance taken by the UCC drafters
to relax common law technical requirements and formalities, the courts
should be more reluctant than they have been to interpret Section 2-201 to
hold signed offers insufficient, especially since they do have a (barely) ade-
quate textual basis to hold those offers sufficient as being the necessary
"indicators" of the existence of a contract that do serve to differentiate
meaningfully the situation from the pure oral agreement situation where the
statute of frauds protections are essential. I do hope that the next court that
45. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2000).
46. Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Howard Butcher Trading Corp., 455 F. Supp. 1150, 1153-54
(E. D. Pa. 1978).
47. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 3, at 754 n.2.
48. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 395-96.
49. Swarthout, supra note 22, at 852-53; LeFevre, supra note 22, at 972-86.
50. MURRAY, supra note 1, at 378.
51. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 80.
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is asked to address such a controversy under UCC Section 2-201 will give
these thoughts that I here advance, as to both the desirability and the
feasibility of taking a different interpretative approach, some consideration.
